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Of Myths and Evidence: An Analysis of 40 U.S. Cases for 
Countries Considering a Private Right of Action for 
Competition Law Violations 
  
 
       Robert H. Lande and  
       Joshua P. Davis1
       May 19, 2009 
 
 
  “[P]rivate rights of action U.S. style  
  are poison. They over-reached dramatically.”  
  Bush Administration Federal Trade Commission  
  Chairman William Kovacic.2
  
   
 This quotation reflects the prevailing view towards 
private rights of action in the competition or antitrust 
field. Many commentators, especially members of the defense 
bar, have criticized the existing United States system of 
private antitrust litigation. Some assert that private actions 
all too often result in remedies that provide lucrative fees 
                     
1 The authors are, respectively, Venable Professor of Law, 
University of Baltimore School of Law, and a Director of the 
American Antitrust Institute; Professor of Law and Director, 
Center for Law and Ethics, University of San Francisco School 
of Law, and member of the Advisory Board of the American 
Antitrust Institute.  This article is a condensation and 
revision of ”Benefits From Private Antitrust Enforcement: An 
Analysis of Forty Cases,” 42 U. San Francisco L. Rev. 879 
(2008), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1090661. 
For summaries of the individual case studies analyzed in this 
article see “Benefits from Antitrust Private Antitrust 




2 William E. Kovacic, speaking at an ABA panel on Exemptions 
and Immunities, quoted in FTC:WATCH No. 708, Nov. 19, 2007, at 
4. Kovacic was summarizing the conventional wisdom in the 
field but was not necessarily agreeing with it. 
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for plaintiffs’ lawyers but secure no significant benefits for 
overcharged victims.3  Others suggest that private litigation 
merely follows an easy trail blazed by government enforcers 
and adds little to government sanctions.4 Yet others contend 
that, in light of government enforcement, private cases in the 
United States lead to excessive deterrence.5
                     
3 Professor Cavanagh ably summarized this belief: “Many class 
action suits generate substantial fees for counsel but produce 
little, if any, benefit to the alleged victims of the 
wrongdoing. Coupon settlements, wherein plaintiffs settle for 
‘cents off’ coupons while their attorneys are paid their full 
fees in cash .... are of dubious value to the victims of 
antitrust violations.... [and] defendants are not forced to 
disgorge their ill-gotten gains when coupons are not 
redeemed.” Edward Cavanagh, Antitrust Remedies Revisited, 84 
Or. L. Rev. 147, 163 (2005)(footnote omitted).  
  Further, one 
 
However, Professor Cavanagh provides only an anecdote to 
support these conclusions.  He offers no data to show the type 
of antitrust settlements he describes are typical or to 
demonstrate how often they result in useless coupons.  
 
4 John C. Coffee, Jr. at one point subscribed to this view, 
but later concluded the evidence was to the contrary.  John C. 
Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney:  The 
Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law 
Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 669 n. 
36 (1986) (“Although the conventional wisdom has long been 
that class actions tend to ‘tag along’ on the heels of 
governmentally initiated suits, a recent study of antitrust 
litigation by Professors Kauper and Snyder has placed this 
figure at ‘[l]ess than 20% of private antitrust actions filed 
between 1976 and 1983.’”).    
 
5 As the Antitrust Modernization Commission noted: “[S]ome 
have argued that treble damages, along with other remedies, 
can overdeter some conduct that may not be anticompetitive and 
result in duplicative recovery. No actual cases or evidence or 
systematic overdeterrence were presented to the Commission, 
however.” ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 247 
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common criticism of private actions in general — and of class 
actions in particular — is that they are a form of legalized 
blackmail or extortion, one in which plaintiffs’ attorneys 
coerce defendants into settlements based not on meritorious 
claims, but rather on the cost of litigation or fear of an 
erroneous and catastrophic judgment.6
                                                                
(2007) (citation omitted), available at 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/amc_f
inal_report.pdf (footnotes omitted).  
  These actions also are 
 
For reasons why “treble damages” do not lead to excessive 
deterrence but, on the contrary should be increased, see 
Robert H. Lande, Five Myths about Antitrust Damages, 40 U.S.F. 
L. Rev. 651 (2006),available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1263478 
 
6 See John H. Beisner and Chares E. Borden, Expanding 
Private Causes of Action:  Lessons from the U.S. Litigation 
Experience, available at 
www.instituteforlegalreform.com/resources/ExpandingPrivateCaus
esofActionFinal.doc.  However, people like Beisner & Bordon 
who embrace this view provide no systematic empirical basis 
for its factual predicates. Similarly unsupported is their 
claim that the cost of discovery for defendants can run into 
“the tens of millions of dollars.”  Id. at 13.  Much the same 
is true for the claim that class counsel receive high fee 
awards but the class receives little of value.  See, e.g., id. 
at 218.  
 
Also lacking is evidence that defendants regularly settle 
antitrust class actions simply to avoid the risk of an 
erroneous, catastrophic loss. This settlement rate is about 
the same as in general litigation.  See, e.g., Allan Kanner 
and Tibor Nagy, Explosing the Black Mail Myth: A New 
Perspective on Class Action Settlements, 57 Baylor L. Rev. 
681, 697 (2005). Moreover, the amounts of these settlements 
are far greater than the cost of defending litigation -- 
suggesting that defendants were responding to a real risk of 
liability in agreeing to pay damages rather than merely 
seeking to avoid the cost of the litigation itself.  
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said to discourage legitimate competitive behavior.7 For these 
and related reasons many members of the antitrust community 
call for the curtailment of private enforcement,8 some even 
for its abolition.9
                     
7 AMC Commissioner Cannon wrote: "Private plaintiffs are very 
often competitors of the firms they accuse of antitrust 
violations, and have every incentive to challenge and thus 
deter hard competition that they cannot or will not meet.... 
litigation is expensive and courts and juries may erroneously 
conclude that procompetitive or competitively neutral conduct 
violates the antitrust laws... potential defendants... will 
refrain from engaging in some forms of potentially 
procompetitive conduct in order to avoid the cost and risk of 
litigation." W. Stephen Cannon, A Reassessment of Antitrust 
Remedies: The Administration’s Antitrust Remedies Reform 
Proposal: Its Derivation and Implications, 55 Antitrust L.J. 
103 (1986). 
   
 
8 For example, Professor Hovenkamp writes that treble damages 
and attorneys' fees for victorious plaintiffs give plaintiffs 
too great an incentive to sue: "As a result, many marginal and 
even frivolous antitrust cases are filed every year, and 
antitrust litigation is often used as a bargaining chip to 
strengthen the hands of plaintiffs who really have other 
complaints." Herbert Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Enterprise: 
Principle and Execution 59 (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press 2005). Professor Hovenkamp does not, however, give data 
that supports his conclusions. 
 
9 For example, Professors Breit and Elzinga would ”replace the 
entire damage induced private actions approach with a system 
of fines (well in excess of current levels). This proposal 
would eliminate the perverse incentives and misinformation 
effects and reparation costs.” William Breit & Kenneth G. 
Elzinga, Private Antitrust Enforcement: The New Learning, 28 
J.L. & Econ. 405, 440 (1985). Professors Elzinga and Breit do 
not, however, provide data to support their conclusions.  
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 Although these criticisms are widespread, they have been 
made without any empirical basis.10  Those who point to the 
alleged flaws of the United Sates system of private antitrust 
enforcement support their arguments only with anecdotes, many 
of which are self-serving or questionable. They never provide 
reliable data.11
 We emphasize that we are not disputing all critics’ 
anecdotes.  Private antitrust enforcement, which includes in 
most years more than 90% of antitrust cases in the United 
States,
   
12 certainly is imperfect.13
                     
10 One prominent critic, former ABA Antitrust Section Chair Jan 
McDavid, candidly admitted this: "[The] issue [of class action 
abuse] was never directly presented in these cases, but many 
of these issues arise in the context of class actions in which 
the potential for abuse is really pretty extraordinary." When 
asked by Andrew Gavil about empirical evidence, McDavid said: 
"I am not aware of empirical data on any of those issues.  My 
empirical data are derived from cases in which I am involved." 
Antitrust, Volume 21, Fall 2007, No. 4, at 12-13.  
  Our point, however, is 
 
11 For example, Michael Denger, former ABA Antitrust Section 
Chair, wrote: “Substantial windfalls go to plaintiffs that are 
not injured or only minimally injured.”  Remarks of Michael L. 
Denger, Chair’s program, 50th Anniversary Spring Meting, ABA 
Antitrust Section, April 24-26, 2002, at 15. Mr. Denger, 
however, provides no data to prove his assertions, or any 
citations to scholarly articles containing such data.  He does 
not even provide a single supporting anecdote. He also does 
not discuss why society would be better off if antitrust 
violators were permitted to keep their illegal windfalls, the 
end result of his positions. 
 
12 See Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics Online, 
http//wwwalbany/edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5412004.pdf Table 
5.41.2004, Antitrust Cases filed in U.S. District Courts, by 
type of case, 1975-2004.  
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that nations considering private enforcement should first 
fairly assess its effects in the United States.  They should 
not confuse anecdotes with data. One factor they should 
consider carefully is the systematic benefit of private 
actions to victimized consumers and businesses, and to the 
economy more generally.  
 
 The Purpose and Design of This Study 
 This article is a first step towards providing the 
empirical data necessary to assess some of the benefits of 
private enforcement of the United States antitrust laws. It 
does this by analyzing a group of 40 recent, successful, 
large-scale private antitrust cases. We analyze, inter alia, 
the amount of money each action recovered for victims, what 
proportion of the money was recovered from foreign entities, 
whether the private litigation was preceded by government 
action, and on whose behalf money was recovered (direct 
purchasers, indirect purchasers, or a competitor).   To our 
knowledge no similar study has ever been undertaken.  
 We note that this report does not purport to be 
comprehensive or in any way definitive.  It does not analyze 
every recent significant private antitrust case, assess a 
                                                                
 
13 Government enforcement also is imperfect.  
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random sample of cases, or even include all of the largest or 
“most important” ones.14  We simply tried to assemble and 
evaluate 40 of the largest and most successful cases that 
concluded between 1990 and 2007.15  
 The primary focus of this project, moreover, was not to 
demonstrate that private litigation often has established 




                     
14 For example, we were not able to include an analysis of the 
consumer class action suits against Microsoft, even though a 
highly respected journalist reported that together these cases 
recovered more than $2 billion for victims.  See Todd Bishop, 
Todd Bishop‘s Microsoft Blog, July 7, 2006, available at 
  Our “first cut” was, instead, to look for  
recent private cases that are final, including appeals, and 
that recovered at least $50 million in cash for victims of 




15 In one case, the final settlement was approved within this 
time frame, but the final award of fees and costs to the 
attorneys did not occur until January, 2008.  See In re Auto. 
Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 569 
(E.D. Pa. Jan. 3, 2008). 
 
18  For an excellent analysis see Stephen Calkins, Coming to 
Praise Criminal Antitrust Enforcement, European University 
Institute 11th EU Competition Law and Policy Workshop, 
(Florence, Italy, June 2-3 2006).  Professor Calkins found 
that, of leading antitrust cases decided before 1977, 12 were 
private and 27 were government.  Of the leading cases decided 
1977 or later, however, he found that 30 were private cases 
and only 15 were government cases. Id. at 17. 
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products, services, discounts, coupons, and injunctive relief 
were not included in our results.19
 
 
 Results of this Study 
 Table 1 shows that the forty cases (or groups of cases)20 
analyzed in this report provided a cumulative recovery in the 
range of at least $18,006 to $19,639 million in allegedly21 
illegally acquired wealth to U.S. consumers and businesses.22
                     
19 Securities were counted in one case because they had a 
readily ascertainable market value. 
  
Of this, more than $5,706 to $7,056 million came from foreign 
companies that violated U.S. antitrust laws. Table 2 shows 
that 18 of the 40 cases involved this kind of recovery, which 
means that without the private enforcement of the antitrust 
laws this money would have remained with foreign lawbreakers 
 
20  To arrive at this number we counted related cases as being 
a single “case.” For example, there have been many separate 
legal actions involving vitamins cartels. However, this report 
analyzes and counts them all together as one “case.”   
 
21  For simplicity we are calling all of the charges 
“allegations,” even the ones proven in court. 
 
22 We did not change recoveries to 2009 dollars or otherwise 
correct for the time-value of money. All figures include the 
awarded attorneys’ fees.  
 
Although a United States verdict would produce treble damages 
for victims, almost all of our cases involved settlements, and 
in no case did a court determine the percentage overcharge.  
We know of no way to determine whether any of the settlements 
exceeded single damages.  
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instead of being returned to U.S. consumers and businesses.23
  It is interesting that of the total amount recovered a 
large proportion - at least 42% to 46%; $7,631 to $8,981 
million - came from the fifteen cases that did not follow 
publicly disclosed United States government or EU enforcement 
actions.
 
Given the current global market, no doubt the lack of a 
private remedy means many citizens of nations other than the 
U.S. remain uncompensated for harms they suffered from illegal 
and anticompetitive conduct by actors beyond their national 
borders. 
24  For each of the cases listed in Table 3, private 
plaintiffs appear to have completely uncovered the violations, 
and initiated and pursued the litigation, with the government 
following the private plaintiffs’ lead or playing no role at 
all.  Another $4,212 million came from cases with a mixed 
private/public origin (Table 4).25
                     
23  This project did not select cases on the basis of whether a 
foreign defendant was likely to be involved.   
 Only about a third of the 
 
24 When conduct gave rise to both government and private 
litigation we tried to ascertain who first uncovered the 
antitrust violation. For many of the cases our researchers 
spent dozens of hours on this issue. However, because 
government records are confidential and the enforcers usually 
do not reveal or discuss their investigations, we could not 
always make definitive classifications. Because we had access 
only to publicly available information some of our 
classifications could be mistaken.  
25  For example In re Polypropylene Carpet Antitrust Litig., 93 
F. Supp. 2d 1348 (N.D. Ga. 2000) started as a result of a 
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total private recovery – $6,163 to $6,446 million – occurred 
in cases that were purely public in origin. 
Still other private cases followed a government 
investigation, but provided significantly greater relief than 
the government action (if, indeed, a government action was 
brought), expanded the scope of inquiry and claims, or 
obtained relief against parties not included in the government 
actions (Table 5). There also were cases whose origin we were 
not able to ascertain.27 The authors were surprised at the 
high proportion of private actions that were filed in the 
absence of government cases, that had mixed public/private 
origins, or that significantly expanded the relief obtained 
through government enforcement alone. 
 Of the total $18,006 to $19,639 million in recoveries we 
documented, $12,088 to $13,438 million (67%-68% of the total), 
in 32 cases, was recovered by direct purchasers; $1,815 
million, in 6 cases, was recovered by indirect purchasers; and 
 
                                                                
different private antitrust suit, which led to a government 
investigation in the polypropylene carpet market, that in turn 
led to the private litigation analyzed in this Report.  See 
Table 4 for other examples. 
 
27 See, for example, the El Paso case summary, Benefits, supra 
note 1.  
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$4,028 to $4,311 million, in 6 cases, was recovered by 
competitors.29  All but 6 of the cases were class actions.30
 Some of the cases we analyzed also involved substantial 
non-monetary relief.  For example, one case generated coupons, 
fully redeemable in cash if not used for five years (however, 
to be very conservative we did not count any part of this in 
our “cash” recovery totals).
 
31  Another case resulted in a $125 
million energy rate reduction for consumers (we did not count 
this reduction in our benefits total).32
                     
29 Direct purchasers are customers who bought a good or service 
directly from a defendant, and indirect purchasers are 
customers who purchased a good or service further down the 
chain of distribution.  In the U.S., in general only direct 
purchasers and competitors can bring claims for damages under 
federal law, and indirect purchasers can bring claims for 
damages only under state law (most, but not all, U.S. states 
allow indirect purchaser actions).   
 Some cases involved 
 
30  Although we did not intend this Report to focus on class 
actions, the requirement of public court approval of class 
action settlements enabled us to obtain information that often 
is not available in individual settlements, the terms of which 
often are confidential.  Final verdicts are, of course, 
publicly available for individual cases, but these are rare in 
the antitrust field. See John M. Connor & Robert H. Lande, How 
High do Cartels Raise Prices? Implications for Optimal Cartel 
Fines, 80 Tul. L. Rev. 513, Appendix (2005), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1105523. 
 
31  See Auction House case summaries, Benefits, supra note 1. 
These coupons traded for a value that reflected their 
discounted present value.  They also comprised 20% of the 
legal fees paid to prevailing attorneys, who said they will 
redeem them for cash after the expiration of the mandatory 
five year waiting period. 
 
32 See the El Paso summary. 
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extremely useful cy pres grants.33  Many other cases 
restructured industries in ways that, according to the judge 
presiding over the litigation, provided improvements for 
competition even more beneficial than the monetary relief they 
conferred on the victims. For example, the Visa/MasterCard 
case was settled in April 2003 for “$3,383,400,000 in 
compensatory relief, plus additional injunctive relief valued 
at $25 to $87 billion or more."34  Similarly, NASDAQ decreased 
the spreads received by market makers, the Insurance 
litigation eliminated restrictions on insurance policies, and 
NCAA eliminated caps on pay to college coaches.35  Further, 
together the generic drug cases — Buspirone, Cardizem, 
Oncology (Taxol), Relafen, Remeron, and Terazosin — 
discouraged collusion between brand name and generic drug 
manufacturers, saving consumers many hundreds of millions of 
dollars in lower cost drugs.36
                     
33  See, for example, the Insurance case.  This case resulted 
in a cash settlement with a creative remedy that: (i) funded 
the development of a public entity that provides risk 
management education and technical services to small 
businesses, public entities, and non profits; and (ii) provide 
funds to the States to develop a risk database for 
municipalities and local governments.  
 
 
34 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa USA & MasterCard Int’l, 
396 F.3d 96, 111 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 
35  See Benefits, supra note 1. 
 
36  See Benefits, supra note 1. 
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In the cases we analyzed, the judges generally expressed 
great satisfaction with the efforts of the plaintiffs’ counsel 
that appeared before them.  To give a few examples, Judge 
Nancy G. Edmunds (E.D. Mich.), in her opinion approving the 
final settlement in the direct purchaser Cardizem case, noted 
plaintiffs attorneys’ “excellent performance on behalf of the 
Class in this hotly contested case.”37 Chief Judge Thomas Hogan 
in one of the vitamins cases (the choline chloride trial) 
stated in his opening remarks to the jury pool:  ”[T]his is a 
very challenging and interesting case ... involving, I think, 
some of the finest business litigating lawyers or litigation-
type lawyers in the country that are before you that you will 
have the privilege to listen to.”38
                     
37 Order granting Sherman Act Class Plaintiffs’ Motions for 
Final Approval of Settlement, Plan of Allocation and Sherman 
Act Class Counsel’s Joint Petition for Attorney’s Fees, 
Reimbursement of Expenses, and Incentive Awards for Named 
Plaintiffs. Order No. 49 at pg 21. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust 
Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 682. Similarly, the Honorable Michael 
M. Mihm, the judge who oversaw the Fructose litigation, 
repeatedly praised class counsel. “I’ve said many times during 
this litigation that you and the attorneys who represented the 
defendants here are as good as it gets.  Very professional... 
You’ve always been cutting to the chase and not wasting my 
time or each others’ time or adding to the cost of the And this 
was very difficult litigation... Skill and efficiency of the 
attorneys. As good as it gets. Complexity and duration of the 
litigation. It was very complex.  We made some new law on more 
than one occasion... .”  See Trial Transcript of Oct. 4, 2004, 
at 45-46. In re Fructose Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 1087, 
Master File No. 94-1577. 
 There are numerous other 
 
38 May 28, 2003 Trial Tr. at 25:1-6.  
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examples of complimentary remarks:  The judge in Automotive 
Refinishing Paint noted that plaintiffs’ counsel “repeatedly 
demonstrated their skill in managing” the litigation;39 the 
court in Buspirone stated, “let me say that the lawyers in 
this case have done a stupendous job.  They really have.”40 The 
court in Remeron thanked counsel on behalf of the judiciary 
“for the kind of lawyering we wish everybody would do”41 and 
noted that “[t]he settlement entered with Defendants is a 






 The United States’ distinctive system of private 
antitrust enforcement is substantially underappreciated. It  
                                                                
 
39 In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 2004 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 29162, at *20 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 13, 2004). 
 
40  http://www.milbergweiss.com/whymilberg citing In re 
Buspirone Patent Litig., MDL Docket No. 1413, at 34:2-3 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 2003) (Final Approval Hearing Transcript).  
The court in Linerboard made repeated comments to the effect 
that “the lawyering in the case at every stage was superb;” 
2005 WL 1221350, at *6 (E.D. Pa. June 2, 2004).  The court in 
Relafen lauded “the exceptional efforts of class counsel” and 
pointed out that the settlement was “the result of a great 
deal of fine lawyering on behalf of the parties.” In re 
Relafen Antitrust Litig., 231 F.R.D. 52, 80 (D. Mass. 2005).  
 
41 In re Remeron Antitrust Litig., Civil Action No. 02-2007 
(FSH) (D.N.J. 2005) (Transcript of Proceedings at 15:16). 
42 In re Remeron Antitrust Litigation, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
27013 at *37 (D.N.J. 2005) (unpublished opinion). 
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has produced tremendous benefits for the United States economy 
- for consumers and for businesses of all sizes.43
 As to the possibility of overdeterrence, the United 
States awards what are nominally "treble damages"
 It has 
helped to deter anticompetitive behavior and to compensate 
victims of illegal activity.  It has enabled U.S. businesses 
and consumers to protect themselves from economic 
exploitation, both by those who subvert the free market in 
general and by foreign cartels in particular. It has saved the 
U.S. taxpayer tremendous sums in enforcement costs by shifting 
the enormous burdens and risks of litigating against 
sophisticated, well-financed lawbreakers to private 
plaintiffs’ counsel. Although negative assertions about the 
efficacy of private United States antitrust litigation have 
been very well publicized, this might well be due in large 
part to the powerful economic interests that stand to benefit 
from a curtailment of private antitrust enforcement in the 
United States and from the prevention of private rights of 
action for competition law violations in other nations.  
44
                     
43 Of course, because our cases were not randomly selected, it 
is difficult to generalize from our conclusions. 
 to 
victorious victims.  But in reality, various constraints on 
 
44 The Unites States antitrust laws award treble damages as 
well as attorneys’ fees to successful private plaintiffs. 15 
U.S.C § 15 (Supp. 1992).   
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recovery mean that, even after nominal trebling of a judgment 
at trial, plaintiffs likely recover less than single actual 
damages.45  Thus, nominal trebling is justified to compensate 
victims for unawarded prejudgment interest, and for difficult-
to-quantify and unawarded damages items such as the allocative 
inefficiency effects of market power and for the value of 
victims' time expended pursuing litigation.46  Further, 
antitrust verdicts producing even nominal treble damages are 
rare,47
                     
45 To the extent the purpose of the remedy is compensation, the 
"damages" caused by an antitrust violation should consist of 
the sum of all relatively predictable harms caused by that 
violation affecting anyone other than the defendants. Damages 
should include the wealth transferred from consumers to the 
violator(s), as well as the allocative inefficiency effects 
felt by society, whether caused directly, or indirectly via 
"umbrella" effects. Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees, the value of 
plaintiffs' time spent pursuing the case, and the cost to the 
American taxpayer of administering the judicial system should 
also be included. When all these adjustments are made it is 
likely that the United States “treble” damages remedy actually 
is less than single damages. See Robert H. Lande, “Are 
Antitrust “Treble” Damages Really Single Damages?” 54 Ohio 
State L.J. 115, 122-24, 158-68 (1993), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1134822. 
 and we believe that few, if any, of the overwhelming 
 
46  Id.  As the Antitrust Modernization Commission noted: 
“Indeed, in light of the fact that some damages may not be 
recoverable (e.g., compensation for interest prior to 
judgment, or because of the statute of limitations and the 
inability to recover ‘speculative’ damages) treble damages 
help ensure that victims will recover at least their actual 
damages.”  Antitrust Modernization Commission, Report and 
Recommendations, at 246 (2007) (footnote omitted). 
 
47  For a list of antitrust verdicts that calculated damages 
amounts see Connor & Lande, supra note 30. 
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majority of antitrust cases that settle do so for more than 
single nominal damages.48
Moreover, while government criminal and civil actions are 
essential to deter future antitrust violations, virtually the 
only way to secure redress for the victims of antitrust 
violations is through private litigation. Private 
enforcement at times 
   
49  
has substituted for federal and state 
action entirely when government did not act at all or did not 
achieve meaningful results. At other times, private actions 
have complemented governmental enforcement in many situations 
where the government investigated, prosecuted, and imposed 
penalties, but was unable to compensate private victims for 
the harms they suffered as a result of antitrust violations. 
Private antitrust enforcement also has restructured many 
industries in ways that have improved efficiency and 
competitiveness, redounding to the benefit of consumers, the 
affected industries themselves, and the economy as a whole.51
                     
48  For an analysis of this issue see Robert H. Lande, “Why 
Antitrust Damage Levels Should Be Raised, 16 Loyola Consumer 




49  In the United States, State Attorneys’ General can bring 
parens patria actions on behalf of victims located within 
their states, and the Federal Trade Commission has succeeded 
in disgorgement actions, but these actions are rare. 
51 As Irwin Stelzer observed, “An army of private enforcers, 
enlisting help from attorney-entrepreneurs free to accept 
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 In fact, there are many reasons to believe that, as a 
practical matter the government cannot be expected to do all 
or even most of the necessary enforcing of antitrust or 
competition laws for various reasons including: budgetary 
constraints;52 undue fear of losing cases;53 lack of awareness 
of industry conditions;54
                                                                
cases on a contingency fee basis, freed of ‘loser pays’ 
obligations, is an important supplement to those limited 
[government] resources.... some 80% of court decisions 
establishing important principles (not all of which I find 
agreeable, I might add) in the competition policy area have 
resulted from private actions.”  Irwin Stelzer, Implications 
for Productivity Growth in the Economy, notes for talk at 
Workshop on Private Enforcement of Competition Law, sponsored 
by Office of Fair Trading, at p. 2 (London, England, Oct. 19, 
2006).  
 overly suspicious views about 
 
52  This is especially true in the current climate of tight 
federal budgets.  
 
53 Professor Calkins notes: “Governmental agencies also 
hesitate to litigate because of fear of defeat.  Courtroom 
setbacks can demoralize agency staff, raise questions in the 
eyes of observers, and impose political costs.  Few agency 
annual reports boast about the well-fought loss, and, in an 
era in which governmental accountability is fashionable, it is 
challenging to characterize losses as accomplishments.  
 
All too often, agencies worry about their win rates....  and 
general counsels who are nominated for higher office like to 
claim that their agency won a high percentage of its cases. 
Everyone wants a good batting average. Unfortunately, a single 
loss can ruin a good batting average compiled with few at-
bats.” Stephen Calkins, In Praise of Antitrust Litigation: The 
Second Annual Bernstein Lecture, 72 St. John’s L. Rev. 1 
(1998) (citations omitted).  
 
54 “Private parties operating in the real markets...[will] act 
on the reality they confront.”  Stelzer, supra note 51, at 4. 
”The administrators of our antitrust laws might not feel 
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complaints by “losers” that they were in fact victims of 
anticompetitive behavior;55 high turnover among government 
attorneys;56 and the unfortunate reality that government 
enforcement (or non-enforcement) decisions are at times 
politically motivated.57
 In the United States anticompetitive conduct occurs far 
too frequently and is almost certainly significantly 
  Not surprisingly, a vigorous private 
antitrust or competition regime is likely to confer 
significant benefits over and above those conferred by a 
system reliant solely upon government enforcement. 
                                                                
competent to tell what sort of pricing practice is 
exclusionary or predatory.  But the victims most certainly 
can.”  Id. at 5. 
 
55 Of course, many do not believe this. “[W]ho better to argue 
that ... [certain conduct is anticompetitive] than a 
competitor, injured by illegal anticompetitive practices, 
conversant in the technical jargon, on the sharp edge of 
customer relations, well informed on the details and 
consequences of the dominant firm’s practices.”  Id. at 5-6. 
 
56 The largest antitrust cases often last for 5-10 years.  The 
government often has trouble retaining a well qualified team 
throughout this period.  Private firms, by contrast, often are 
able to retain relatively intact teams for longer periods. 
 
57  Irwin Stelzer noted: “A less obvious but equally important 
reason that private enforcement is so important is that it is 
free of direct political influence.  In America, 
administrations come and go, some more given to a jaundiced 
view of the activities of dominant firms than others, witness 
the soft settlement worked out with Microsoft when the Bush 
administration took office and control of the Department of 
Justice, and its current disinclination to file any Section 2 




Having said that, we recognize each nation has unique 
needs, history, institutions, capabilities and circumstances, 
and we would never advocate “one size fits all” competition 
legislation.  But we do urge every nation without private 
enforcement of its competition laws to seriously consider that 
possibility.  In doing so, policymakers should consider 
private enforcement as it actually works in the United States, 
not a mere caricature, one too often presented by self-
interested parties who oppose antitrust enforcement in 
general. 
 - even factoring in the effects of the present 
system of private litigation.  A fortiori this conduct would 
be even more undeterred if the United States eliminated or 
substantially curtailed private enforcement.  We would be  
surprised if firms in other nations were significantly more 
law abiding than those in the United States, and suspect that 
the United States record of underdeterrence of anticompetitive 
conduct (and undercompensation of victims) exists in many 




                     


















The following tables provide a summary of key information 
about the antitrust cases studied by this report. For the 
individual analyses of the 40 cases studied in our report see 
“Benefits from Antitrust Private Antitrust Enforcement: Forty 
Individual Case Studies,” 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1105523. 
All results were rounded to the nearest million dollars: 
 
Table 1: Recoveries in Private Cases 
 
 
Case Recovery ($ millions) 
 
Airline Ticket Commission 
Litigation 
 
  86 
Auction Houses 
 
 452 (plus 100 in uncounted 
fully redeemable coupons) 
Augmentin 
 
  91 
Automotive Refinishing Paint 
 





















  326 
Drill Bits 
 
   53 
El Paso 
 




  122 
Fructose             
 
  531 
 
Graphite Electrodes      47 
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IBM   775 (plus $75 in uncounted 
credit towards Microsoft 
software) 
Insurance             
 
   36 
Lease Oil 
 
  193 
Linerboard           
 
  202 
 




   50 





   74 
Netscape 
 
  750 
Paxil 
 
  165 
Platinol 
 
   50 
Polypropylene Carpet 
 
   50 
RealNetworks 
 




  250 
Remeron 
 
   75 
Rubber Chemicals 
 
  268 
Sorbates                  
 
   96 




  700 
Taxol 
 
   66 
Terazosin      
 
   74 
Urethane    73 
 
 24 
Visa/MasterCard     
 
3,383 
Vitamins 3,908 to 5,258 
 
Total          
 
18,006 to 19,639 





       
 25 




Recovery ($ millions) 
Auction Houses 
 
virtually all the $452 was 
recovered by U.S. citizens 
Augmentin   91 
 
Automotive Refinishing Paint 
 
  31 
Cardizem  110 
 
Citric Acid   55 plus unidentified 
recoveries by opt outs 
Commercial Explosives 
 
  62 
  




  47 







  24 
Microcrystalline Cellulose   25 
 
Remeron            
 
  75 
Relafen 
 
Unknown amount - much of $250; 
but not included in totals 





  36 
Urethane   73 
 














Recovery ($ millions) 
Augmentin 
 







Taxol               
 












   50 
NCAA 
 
   74 





  193 
Paxil 
 
  165 
Relafen 
 




   75 
Vitamins                 
 
3,908  to  5,258 
Total               7,631  to 8,981 
 
 
Note: We did not include cases in which we were unable to 
determine whether private or public action came first, in 
which the two arose simultaneously or in a mixed fashion, or 
which resulted from government investigation into a different 
conspiracy.   
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Recovery ($ millions) 
Drill bits - private suit led 
to government investigation 
which prompted this suit                 
 53 
Flat Glass - DOJ 
investigation but no 
indictment or civil 
proceeding ever initiated by 
government 
122 
Fructose - uncovered by 
government action, but no 
indictments                
 
531 
Polypropylene Carpet - 
conduct uncovered in 
different private case, to 
DOJ investigation, to private 
case 
 50 
Urethane - grew out of a 
government investigation into 
a conspiracy involving a 
different chemical 
 73 
Visa/MasterCard – unclear 
which investigation began 
first, although private 
action was filed well before 
government action and 
addressed different conduct. 
 3,383 
















Table 5: Private Recoveries that Were Significantly Broader 
than the Government Enforcement Action (in addition to all of 
the compensation to victims noted in Table 1) (Does not 
include the cases in Table 3 that were not preceded by a 




Why private recovery was 
significantly more than 
government remedy 
Automotive Refinishing Paint 
 
Government investigation 
yielded no indictments; 
private cases got $106 
million. 
El Paso Private plaintiffs obviated 
need for separate government 
action seeking monetary 
recovery. 
Fructose Government did not indict 
antitrust violators. 
Insurance Private plaintiffs provided 
compensation and contributed 
to restructuring of industry, 
eliminating restrictions on 
insurance and reinsurance. 
Linerboard FTC action was against one 
firm for unilateral conduct; 
the private case involved a 
conspiracy. 
Polypropylene Carpet Private plaintiffs obtained 
greater monetary recovery and 
prosecuted larger number of 
defendants. 
Relafen No federal case; state 
governments intervened only 
after settlement – private 
plaintiffs provided the 
compensation to victims. 
Sun v. Microsoft Private plaintiffs made 
broader allegations than U.S. 
government action, obtained 
information that supported 
later European action, and 
protected distribution of 
“pure” Java software. 




 Table 6: Recoveries by Category of Plaintiff 
 
Direct       Indirect    Competitor    Unsure 
 





 62  Augmentin   29 Conwood 1,050   
Lysine                50 Lysine     15 Sun   700 
 
  










 106 Paxil  65 Caldera  275   
Buspirone 
 
220 Relafen  75 IBM  775   
Cardizem            
 
110 El Paso 1,427 Netscape  750   
DRAM 
 
326       
Citric Acid 
 
175       
Flat Glass 
 
121       
Fructose            
 




 47       
Insurance           
 
 36       
Linerboard         
 
202       
Microcrystalline 
Cellulose 
 50       
Oil Lease 
 
193       
Paxil  
 
100       
Platinol 
 
 50       
Polypropylene 
Carpet 
 50       
Relafen 
 




   50       
Terazosin 
 
   74        
Urethane    73 
 
      
Visa/MasterCard   
 






      
NASDAQ           
 
1,027       
Sorbates 96 
 
      
Drill Bits 
 




77       
Remeron 
 
75       
Rubber Chemicals  268       
Taxol 
 
 66       
Airline Tickets 
Commission 









Note: The El Paso settlement was recovered mostly, but not 
entirely, by indirect purchasers. We have not been able to 
segregate the small amount of recovery by direct purchasers.  
 
In addition, it should be noted that NCAA involved a monopsony 
by direct purchasers. The Airline Tickets Commission case also 
involved collusion by buyers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
